Paper Info
Title
Efficiency persistence of bank and thrift CEOs using data envelopment analysis
Abstract
We examine the performance of chief executive officers (CEOs) of US banks and thrifts. We apply data envelopment analysis (DEA) to measure the performance of CEOs on a yearly basis over the 1997-2004 period, and find evidence that best-practice CEOs who have a DEA efficiency score of one are rewarded with higher compensation compared to under-performing CEOs who have a DEA efficiency score greater than one. We find DEA efficiency score to be a highly significant predictor of CEO compensation, even after adjusting for firm size. In addition, we find that DEA efficiency scores of CEOs have decreased over the observation period. We also find that best-practice CEOs tend to be persistent on a yearly basis, but we find little evidence of multi-period persistence. The results of this study can serve as a benchmark for CEOs wishing to evaluate their performance relative to their peers, and as a new measure of CEO performance.
Year
DOI
Venue
2009
10.1016/j.cor.2008.02.016
Computers & OR
Keywords
DocType
Volume
higher compensation,best-practice CEOs,yearly basis,US bank,thrift CEOs,under-performing CEOs,efficiency persistence,CEO performance,new measure,DEA efficiency score,observation period,data envelopment analysis,CEO compensation
Journal
36
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
5
Computers and Operations Research
4
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.51
0
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Yao Chen154440.02
Greg N. Gregoriou2364.04
Fabrice Douglas Rouah340.51