Paper Info
Title
Preference-based English reverse auctions
Abstract
This paper studies English reverse auctions within a unified framework for preference-based English reverse auctions. In this context, and particularly for electronic auctions, representing and handling the buyer@?s preferences, so as to enable him/her to obtain the best possible outcome, is a major issue. Existing auction mechanisms, which are based on single or multi-attribute utility functions, are only able to represent transitive and complete preferences. It is well known, however, in the preference modeling literature that more general preference structures, allowing intransitivity and incomparability, are more appropriate to capture preferences. On the other hand, we must also consider properties on the evolution and, above all, on the outcome of any auction executed by an auction mechanism. These properties, as well as properties of non-dominance and fair competition defined for multiple criteria auctions, impose restrictions on the preference relation. This leaves room for interesting preference models to be implemented within English reverse auction mechanisms.
Year
DOI
Venue
2011
10.1016/j.artint.2010.11.015
Artif. Intell.
Keywords
Field
DocType
preference-based english reverse auction,existing auction mechanism,complete preference,auction mechanism,english reverse auction mechanism,preference modeling literature,general preference structure,preference relation,interesting preference model,multiple criteria auction,electronic auction,multiple criteria decision analysis,reverse auction
Preference relation,Mathematical economics,Unique bid auction,Combinatorial auction,Auction theory,Common value auction,Intransitivity,Reverse auction,Forward auction,Mathematics
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
175
7-8
0004-3702
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
8
0.44
21
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Marie-jo Bellosta18456.39
Sylvie Kornman2473.61
Daniel Vanderpooten3115374.66