Paper Info
Title
Towards microeconomic resources allocation in overlay networks
Abstract
Inherent selfishness of end-users is the main challenging problem in order to design mechanisms for overlay multicast networks. Here, the goal is to design the mechanisms that can be able to exploit the selfishness of the endusers in such a way that still leads to maximization of the network's aggregated utility. We have designed a competitive economical mechanism in which a number of independent services are provided to the end-users by a number of origin servers. Each offered service can be thought of as a commodity and the origin servers and the users who relay the service to their downstream nodes can thus be thought of as producers of the economy. Also, the end-users can be viewed as consumers of the economy. The proposed mechanism regulates the price of each service in such a way that general equilibrium holds. So, all allocations will be Pareto optimal in the sense that the social welfare of the users is maximized.
Year
DOI
Venue
2010
10.1007/978-3-642-15470-6_24
AMT
Keywords
Field
DocType
offered service,competitive economical mechanism,towards microeconomic resources allocation,inherent selfishness,general equilibrium,downstream node,overlay network,independent service,aggregated utility,pareto optimal,proposed mechanism,origin server,resource allocation,social welfare
Data mining,Computer science,Microeconomics,Server,Exploit,Overlay multicast,Selfishness,Multicast,General equilibrium theory,Overlay network,Maximization
Conference
Volume
ISSN
ISBN
6335.0
0302-9743
3-642-15469-7
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
2
0.41
13
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Morteza Analoui112424.94
Mohammad Hossein Rezvani2409.06