Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We consider infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information. A game is a K-coordination game if each player can decrease other players' payoffs by at most K times his own cost of punishment. The number K represents the degree of commonality of payoffs among the players. The smaller K is, the more interest the players share. A K-coordination game tapers off if the greatest payoff variation conditional on the first t periods of an efficient history converges to 0 at a rate faster than K−t as t→∞. We show that every subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is efficient in any tapering-off game with perfect information. Applications include asynchronously repeated games, repeated games of extensive form games, asymptotically finite horizon games, and asymptotically pure coordination games. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2005 | 10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.012 | Games and Economic Behavior |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
C70,C72,C73 | Welfare economics,Combinatorial game theory,Mathematical economics,Repeated game,Subgame perfect equilibrium,Symmetric game,Sequential game,Bayesian game,Mathematics,Stochastic game,Extensive-form game | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
53 | 2 | 0899-8256 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
3 | 0.59 | 1 |
Authors | ||
1 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Satoru Takahashi | 1 | 33 | 4.39 |