Title
Protecting Obfuscation Against Algebraic Attacks.
Abstract
Recently, Garg, Gentry, Halevi, Raykova, Sahai, and Waters (FOCS 2013) constructed a general-purpose obfuscating compiler for NC1 circuits. We describe a simplified variant of this compiler, and prove that it is a virtual black box obfuscator in a generic multilinear map model. This improves on Brakerski and Rothblum (eprint 2013) who gave such a result under a strengthening of the Exponential Time Hypothesis. We remove this assumption, and thus resolve an open question of Garg et al. As shown by Garg et al., a compiler for NC1 circuits can be bootstrapped to a compiler for all polynomial-sized circuits under the learning with errors (LWE) hardness assumption. Our result shows that there is a candidate obfuscator that cannot be broken by algebraic attacks, hence reducing the task of creating secure obfuscators in the plain model to obtaining sufficiently strong security guarantees on candidate instantiations of multilinear maps.
Year
DOI
Venue
2013
10.1007/978-3-642-55220-5_13
ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY - EUROCRYPT 2014
DocType
Volume
ISSN
Journal
8441
0302-9743
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
119
2.86
11
Authors
5
Search Limit
100119
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Boaz Barak12563127.61
Sanjam Garg2171069.92
Yael Tauman Kalai32502104.65
Omer Paneth453522.42
Amit Sahai513566545.52