Paper Info
Title
Mechanism design for sensor fusion: tactical networks as a foil for ultra large scale systems
Abstract
Economic mechanisms, such as markets and auctions, offer a design language and mathematical concepts that might prove to be effective in addressing human incentives as first-class elements in the design of ultra large-scale systems. To study this possibility at realistic but controllable scale, we developed an emulation of a combat system tactical data network, and developed a variant of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism to allocate network bandwidth for radar sensor fusion. The overall conclusion of the study is that economic mechanisms are a feasible and interesting alternative to traditional systems approaches to resource allocation in systems that are highly dynamic, and that involve many actors engaged in varying activities, and having varying and possibly competing, goals.
Year
DOI
Venue
2008
10.1145/1370700.1370715
Proceedings of the 2nd international workshop on Ultra-large-scale software-intensive systems
Keywords
DocType
Citations 
ultra large scale system,controllable scale,sensor data fusion,bandwidth allocation,interesting alternative,varying activity,vickrey-clarke-groves mechanism,combat system tactical data,first-class element,mechanism design,economic mechanism,tactical network,human incentive,design language,network bandwidth,tactical data networks,sensor fusion,resource allocation
Conference
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
11
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Kurt Wallnau156755.06
Mark Klein248564.57
Daniel Plakosh3384.62