Title
Energy efficiency via incentive design and utility learning
Abstract
Utility companies have many motivations for modifying energy consumption patterns of consumers such as revenue decoupling and demand response programs. We model the utility company-consumer interaction as a principal-agent problem and present an iterative algorithm for designing incentives while estimating the consumer's utility function.
Year
DOI
Venue
2014
10.1145/2566468.2576849
HiCoNS
Keywords
Field
DocType
principal-agent problem,utility company-consumer interaction,demand response program,revenue decoupling,utility function,incentive design,utility learning,iterative algorithm,utility company,modifying energy consumption pattern,energy efficiency,game theory
Revenue,Mathematical optimization,Incentive,Efficient energy use,Iterative method,Computer science,Demand response,Game theory,Transferable utility,Energy consumption,Distributed computing
Conference
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
1
0.35
3
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Lillian J. Ratliff18723.32
Roy Dong27912.05
Henrik Ohlsson330525.91
Shankar Sastry4119771291.58