Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We develop a secure keyword auction mechanism in which winners and payments are calculated without making bidding prices and CTRs public. First, we show that even if we utilize cryptographic techniques, the auctioneer can learn most bidding prices in existing keyword auction mechanisms, such as the Generalized Second Price (GSP) and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. Thus we propose a new auction mechanism by introducing a simple but sufficient payment rule to prevent the leakage of bidding prices. The existing GSP is not strategy-proof, and neither is our new mechanism. However, possible manipulations are limited. We also propose a secure keyword auction scheme that securely realizes our mechanism by utilizing cryptographic techniques. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2009 | 10.1109/WI-IAT.2009.187 | IAT |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
keyword auction mechanism,bidding prices,secure keyword auction mechanism,new mechanism,preserving privacy,ctrs public,secure keyword auction,cryptographic technique,bidding price,secure keyword auction scheme,generalized second price,new auction mechanism,existing gsp,fabrication,circuits,electronic commerce,intelligent agent,mechanism design,internet,privacy,cryptography | Vickrey auction,Eauction,Computer science,Computer security,Generalized second-price auction,Auction theory,Auction algorithm,Revenue equivalence,Reverse auction,Double auction | Conference |
Citations | PageRank | References |
1 | 0.39 | 6 |
Authors | ||
4 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yuko Sakurai | 1 | 201 | 31.37 |
| Makoto Yokoo | 2 | 3632 | 421.99 |
| Atsushi Iwasaki | 3 | 292 | 31.81 |
| Koutarou Suzuki | 4 | 518 | 29.57 |