Paper Info
Title
Boundedly Rational Agents Achieving Collusive Outcomes In The Cournot Game
Abstract
We show that boundedly rational agents that have no knowledge about their opponents or the market characteristics are able to obtain very high, and sometimes even collusive profits in a Cournot duopoly game. Furthermore, these agents are able to induce other agent types (that are not able to sustain the cartel outcome amongst each other) to join the cartel as well.
Year
Venue
Keywords
2002
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 6TH JOINT CONFERENCE ON INFORMATION SCIENCES
rational agent
Field
DocType
Citations 
Economics,Mathematical economics,Rational agent,Cournot competition
Conference
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
1
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Floortje Alkemade1334.61
Johannes A. La Poutré230824.78