Title
Manipulating boolean games through communication
Abstract
We address the issue of manipulating games through communication. In the specific setting we consider (a variation of Boolean games), we assume there is some set of environment variables, the value of which is not directly accessible to players; each player has their own beliefs about these variables, and makes decisions about what actions to perform based on these beliefs. The communication we consider takes the form of (truthful) announcements about the value of some environment variables; the effect of an announcement about some variable is to modify the beliefs of the players who hear the announcement so that they accurately reflect the value of the announced variables. By choosing announcements appropriately, it is possible to perturb the game away from certain rational outcomes and towards others. We specifically focus on the issue of stabilisation: making announcements that transform a game from having no stable states to one that has stable configurations.
Year
DOI
Venue
2011
10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-046
IJCAI
Keywords
Field
DocType
environment variable,certain rational outcome,boolean game,own belief,stable configuration,announced variable,stable state
Stable states,Computer science,Simulation,Human–computer interaction,Artificial intelligence,Machine learning
Conference
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
22
1.08
6
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
John Grant11025.89
Sarit Kraus26810768.04
Michael Wooldridge310010810.27
Inon Zuckerman410515.22