Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We introduce the notion of fault tolerant mechanism design, which extends the standard game theoretic framework of mechanism design to allow for uncertainty about execution. Specifically, we define the problem of task allocation in which the private information of the agents is not only their costs to attempt the tasks, but also their probabilities of failure. For several different instances of this setting we present technical results, including positive ones in the form of mechanisms that are incentive compatible, individually rational and efficient, and negative ones in the form of impossibility theorems. |
Year | Venue | Keywords |
|---|---|---|
2013 | UAI'02 Proceedings of the Eighteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence | mechanism design,task allocation,standard game theoretic framework,execution uncertainty,impossibility theorem,fault tolerant mechanism design,private information,technical result,different instance,fault tolerant,incentive compatibility |
DocType | Volume | ISBN |
Journal | abs/1301.0595 | 1-55860-897-4 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
15 | 2.27 | 4 |
Authors | ||
4 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ryan Porter | 1 | 238 | 21.45 |
| Amir Ronen | 2 | 1152 | 169.60 |
| Yoav Shoham | 3 | 5530 | 764.00 |
| Moshe Tennenholtz | 4 | 3650 | 437.92 |