Abstract | ||
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The forthcoming NIST's Advanced Hash Standard (AHS) competition to select SHA-3 hash function requires that each candidate hash function submission must have at least one construction to support FIPS 198 HMAC application. As part of its evaluation, NIST is aiming to select either a candidate hash function which is more resistant to known side channel attacks (SCA) when plugged into HMAC, or that has an alternative MAC mode which is more resistant to known SCA than the other submitted alternatives. In response to this, we perform differential power analysis (DPA) on the possible smart card implementations of some of the recently proposed MAC alternatives to NMAC (a fully analyzed variant of HMAC) and HMAC algorithms and NMAC/HMAC versions of some recently proposed hash and compression function modes. We show that the recently proposed BNMAC and KMDP MAC schemes are even weaker than NMAC/HMAC against the DPA attacks, whereas multi-lane NMAC, EMD MAC and the keyed wide-pipe hash have similar security to NMAC against the DPA attacks. Our DPA attacks do not work on the NMAC setting of MDC-2, Grindahl and MAME compression functions. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2008 | 10.1007/978-3-540-88625-9_8 | ICICS |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
hmac version,candidate hash function,nmac setting,hmac algorithm,hmac application,sha-3 hash function,dpa attack,keyed wide-pipe hash,sha-3 requirements,candidate hash function submission,multi-lane nmac,side channel analysis,differential power analysis,smart card,hash functions,hash function,hmac,side channel attacks | SHA-2,Hash-based message authentication code,Computer science,Cryptographic hash function,Computer network,Hash function,Secure Hash Standard,Hash chain,Collision attack,Secure Hash Algorithm | Conference |
Volume | ISSN | Citations |
5308 | 0302-9743 | 7 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.71 | 30 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Praveen Gauravaram | 1 | 256 | 22.22 |
Katsuyuki Okeya | 2 | 447 | 38.47 |