Title
An authenticated key exchange to improve the security of Shi et al. and Kim et al.'s protocols
Abstract
Understanding security failures of authenticated key exchange protocols is the key to both patching existing protocols and designing future protocols. In 2009, Kim et al. proposed an authenticated key exchange protocol to improve the security of Shi et al.'s protocol between user, service provider, and key distribution center (KDC). The protocol was based on the symmetric cryptosystem, challenge-response, Diffie-Hellman component, and hash function. This paper proves how, Kim et al.'s protocol fails to achieve its basic goal of securely establishing a common secret key among communication parties. We also present how to resolve the security problems of the protocol.
Year
DOI
Venue
2011
10.1007/978-3-642-23971-7_34
WISM (1)
Keywords
Field
DocType
understanding security failure,basic goal,security problem,diffie-hellman component,communication party,common secret key,patching existing protocol,key distribution center,future protocol,authenticated key exchange protocol,security,cryptography,hash chain
Key distribution,Computer security,Computer science,Oakley protocol,Authenticated Key Exchange,Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol,Computer network,Security association,Key distribution center,Key-agreement protocol,Hash chain
Conference
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
6987
0302-9743
1
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.39
14
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Mijin Kim1449.04
Changyoung Kwon210.39
Dongho Won31262154.14