Title
Characterization of the relations between information-theoretic non-malleability, secrecy, and authenticity
Abstract
Roughly speaking, an encryption scheme is said to be nonmalleable, if no adversary can modify a ciphertext so that the resulting message is meaningfully related to the original message. We compare this notion of security to secrecy and authenticity, and provide a complete characterization of their relative strengths. In particular, we show that information-theoretic perfect non-malleability is equivalent to perfect secrecy of two different messages. This implies that for n-bit messages a shared secret key of length roughly 2n is necessary to achieve non-malleability, which meets the previously known upper bound. We define approximate non-malleability by relaxing the security conditions and only requiring non-malleability to hold with high probability (over the choice of secret key), and show that any authentication scheme implies approximate non-malleability. Since authentication is possible with a shared secret key of length roughly log n, the same applies to approximate non-malleability.
Year
DOI
Venue
2011
10.1007/978-3-642-20728-0_2
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
Keywords
DocType
Volume
resulting message,information-theoretic non-malleability,information-theoretic perfect non-malleability,perfect secrecy,n-bit message,secret key,encryption scheme,original message,authentication scheme,approximate non-malleability,different message,upper bound
Conference
2011
ISSN
Citations 
PageRank 
0302-9743
6
0.56
References 
Authors
16
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Akinori Kawachi118520.66
Christopher Portmann2111.15
Keisuke Tanaka327819.04