Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Consider an n-person stochastic game with Borel state space S, compact metric action sets A 1, A 2,…, A n, and law of motion q such that the integral under q of every bounded Borel measurable function depends measurably on the initial state x and continuously on the actions ( a 1, a 2,…, a n) of the players. If the payoff to each player i is 1 or 0 according to whether or not the stochastic process of states stays forever in a given Borel set G i, then there is an e-equilibrium for every e>0. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2003 | 10.1007/s001820300148 | International Journal of Game Theory |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
nash equilibrium,borel sets | Journal | 32 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
1 | 1432-1270 | 3 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
1.72 | 3 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ashok P. Maitra | 1 | 29 | 3.31 |
| William D. Sudderth | 2 | 62 | 16.34 |