Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In this paper, we describe a technique for optimizing the algebraic method that is applied to higher order differential attack. The higher order differential attack is a well-known attack on block ciphers, in which we derive an attack equation to determine a round key from a property of a higher order differential of a target block cipher. The algebraic method is a linearization of the attack equation and determines the true key by a method such as Gaussian elimination. Our technique is based on linear dependency and can reduce the complexity of that method. We also describe a technique that allows the algebraic method to be used as an attack equation that holds probabilistically. We demonstrate this method by attacking a five-round MISTY1 and show that it needs 2(21.6) chosen plaintexts and 2(28.0) encryption times. The computer simulation took about two minutes to complete. |
Year | Venue | Keywords |
|---|---|---|
2004 | IEICE TRANSACTIONS ON FUNDAMENTALS OF ELECTRONICS COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER SCIENCES | MISTY1, higher order differential attack, algebraic method, linear dependency, probabilistic attack equation |
Field | DocType | Volume |
Linear dependency,Discrete mathematics,MISTY1,Algebraic method,Theoretical computer science,Mathematics | Journal | E87A |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
1 | 1745-1337 | 8 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.69 | 1 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yasuo Hatano | 1 | 84 | 6.65 |
| Hidema Tanaka | 2 | 98 | 20.35 |
| Toshinobu Kaneko | 3 | 202 | 32.86 |