Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Let A be a finite set of m alternatives, let N be a finite set of n players, and let RN be a profile of linear orders on A of the players. Let uN be a profile of utility functions for RN. We define the nontransferable utility (NTU) game VuN that corresponds to simple majority voting, and investigate its Aumann-Davis-Maschler and Mas-Colell bargaining sets. The first bargaining set is nonempty for m ≤ 3, and it may be empty for m ≥ 4. However, in a simple probabilistic model, for fixed m, the probability that the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set is nonempty tends to one if n tends to infinity. The Mas-Colell bargaining set is nonempty for m ≤ 5, and it may be empty for m ≥ 6. Furthermore, it may be empty even if we insist that n be odd, provided that m is sufficiently large. Nevertheless, we show that the Mas-Colell bargaining set of any simple majority voting game derived from the k-fold replication of RN is nonempty, provided that k ≥ n+2. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2007 | 10.1287/moor.1070.0275 | Mathematics of Operations Research |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
simple majority voting game,ntu game,majority rule,simple majority voting,n player,finite set,m alternative,voting game,mas-colell bargaining,majority voting games,mas-colell bargaining set,fixed m,aumann-davis-maschler bargaining set,bargaining sets,bargaining set | Journal | 32 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
4 | 0364-765X | 1 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.41 | 2 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ron Holzman | 1 | 287 | 43.78 |
| Bezalel Peleg | 2 | 67 | 19.48 |
| Peter Sudhölter | 3 | 115 | 22.09 |