Name
Title | ||
|---|---|---|
Quasi-variational inequalities, generalized Nash equilibria, and multi-leader-follower games |
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
. The noncooperative multi-leader-follower game can be formulated as a generalized Nash equilibrium problem where each player
solves a nonconvex mathematical program with equilibrium constraints. Two major deficiencies exist with such a formulation:
One is that the resulting Nash equilibrium may not exist, due to the nonconvexity in each player’s problem; the other is that
such a nonconvex Nash game is computationally intractable. In order to obtain a viable formulation that is amenable to practical
solution, we introduce a class of remedial models for the multi-leader-follower game that can be formulated as generalized
Nash games with convexified strategy sets. In turn, a game of the latter kind can be formulated as a quasi-variational inequality
for whose solution we develop an iterative penalty method. We establish the convergence of the method, which involves solving
a sequence of penalized variational inequalities, under a set of modest assumptions. We also discuss some oligopolistic competition
models in electric power markets that lead to multi-leader-follower games. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2009 | 10.1007/s10287-004-0010-0 | Comput. Manag. Science |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
penalty method,electric power,nash equilibrium,nash equilibria,variational inequality | Mathematical optimization,Mathematical economics,Epsilon-equilibrium,Price of stability,Leader follower,Best response,Equilibrium selection,Nash equilibrium,Mathematics,Penalty method,Variational inequality | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
2 | 1 | 1619-6988 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
152 | 9.70 | 22 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jong-Shi Pang | 1 | 2852 | 412.73 |
| Masao Fukushima | 2 | 2050 | 172.73 |