Title
Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games
Abstract
This paper compares the leader and follower payoff in a duopoly game, as they arise in sequential play, with the Nash payoff in simultaneous play. If the game is symmetric, has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, and players' payoffs are monotonic in the opponent's choice along their own best reply function, then the follower payoff is either higher than the leader payoff, or even lower than in the simultaneous game. This gap for the possible follower payoff had not been observed in earlier duopoly models of endogenous timing.
Year
DOI
Venue
2010
10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.012
Games and Economic Behavior
Keywords
Field
DocType
C72,D43,L13
Simultaneous game,Duopoly,Economics,Mathematical economics,Risk dominance,Microeconomics,Repeated game,Symmetric game,Traveler's dilemma,Nash equilibrium,Stochastic game
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
69
2
0899-8256
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
2
0.62
2
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Bernhard von Stengel127538.51
Bernhard von Stengel227538.51