Paper Info
Title
On repeated games with complete information
Abstract
We consider N person repeated games with complete information and standard signalling. We first prove several ptopeities of the sets of feasible payo^s and Nash equilibrium payoffs for the n-stage game and for the X-discounted game. In the second part we determine the set of equilibrium payoffs for the Prisoner's Dilemma corresponding to the critical value of the discount factor.
Year
DOI
Venue
1986
10.1287/moor.11.1.147
Math. Oper. Res.
Keywords
DocType
Volume
complete information,repeated game
Journal
11
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
1
0364-765X
46
PageRank 
References 
Authors
11.92
1
1
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Sylvain Sorin130049.48