Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We study strategic games in the tradition of cooperative game theory, where players may make binding agreements that involve side payments. We use a decomposition of strategic games into competitive and cooperative components to define and axiomatize a solution that unifies earlier solutions and generalizes to the case of incomplete information. In the latter case, we give incentive compatible mechanisms that achieve first-best efficiency. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2010 | 10.1145/1807342.1807397 | EC |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
latter case,incomplete information,first-best efficiency,strategic game,incentive compatible mechanism,earlier solution,binding agreement,private information,side payment,cooperative game theory,cooperative component,incentive compatibility | Economics,Strategic complements,Microeconomics,Repeated game,Global game,Game theory,Bayesian game,Sequential game,Screening game,Non-cooperative game | Conference |
Citations | PageRank | References |
4 | 0.74 | 1 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adam Tauman Kalai | 1 | 1620 | 115.10 |
| Ehud Kalai | 2 | 135 | 44.65 |