Title
TrustedBox: A Kernel-Level Integrity Checker
Abstract
There is a large number of situations in which computer security is unpopular. In fact, common users do not like too much restricted security policies. Usability is often preferred to security. Many users want to be free to use their computers to run untrusted applications. Moreover, it is not possible to require that every computer user is a security expert. As a consequence, it is very easy for hackers to gain access to a computer system, and to perform a number of unauthorized operations.In this paper we focus on the problem of system integrity. There are some applications in which system integrity is at least as important as privacy and service availability. For this purpose, we have designed and implemented TrustedBox, a kernel-level integrity checker that can be used to enforce a very restricted security policy and that allows users to use the same system to perform untrusted operations.
Year
DOI
Venue
1999
10.1109/CSAC.1999.816027
ACSAC
Keywords
Field
DocType
kernel-level integrity checker,untrusted operation,computer system,untrusted application,security expert,large number,computer security,restricted security policy,system integrity,computer user,system integration,application software,privacy,usability,data integrity,security policy,availability
Sandbox (computer security),Asset (computer security),Computer science,Computer security,Covert channel,Security service,System integrity,Data integrity,Security policy,Computer security model
Conference
ISBN
Citations 
PageRank 
0-7695-0346-2
7
0.71
References 
Authors
7
1
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Pietro Iglio113916.58