Title
Bounding the inefficiency of Nash equilibria in games with finitely many players
Abstract
This paper derives bounds on the gap between optimal performance and the performance of Nash equilibria in n-person games with continuous action sets. Specific interesting expressions are obtained for the average efficiency per player in congestion games.
Year
DOI
Venue
2007
10.1016/j.orl.2006.12.006
Oper. Res. Lett.
Keywords
Field
DocType
congestion game,nash equilibrium,average efficiency,n-person game,specific interesting expression,continuous action set,optimal performance,price of anarchy,global optimization,nash equilibria
Mathematical optimization,Mathematical economics,Epsilon-equilibrium,Expression (mathematics),Best response,Inefficiency,Game theory,Nash equilibrium,Mathematics,Traffic congestion,Bounding overwatch
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
35
6
Operations Research Letters
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
5
Authors
1
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Uriel G. Rothblum1595125.62