Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We study a buffer that implements the Random Early Detect/Discard (RED) mechanism to cope with congestion, and offers service differentiation by proposing a finite number of slopes at different prices for the RED probability. As a characteristic, the smaller the slope, the better the resulting QoS. Users are sensitive to their average throughput and to the price they pay. Since the study of the noncooperative game played is rendered difficult by the discrete nature of the strategy sets, and since it is not likely that users have a perfect knowledge of the game but only know their experienced utility, we introduce a decentralized learning algorithm to progressively reach a Nash equilibrium over time. We examine the effect of prices on the final game outcomes. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2007 | 10.1109/ICCCN.2007.4317843 | PROCEEDINGS - 16TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS AND NETWORKS, VOLS 1-3 |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
quality of service,nash equilibrium,random early detection,qos,game theory | Minimax,Mathematical optimization,Price of stability,Simulation,Computer science,Best response,Implementation theory,Quality of service,Game theory,Price of anarchy,Nash equilibrium,Distributed computing | Conference |
ISSN | Citations | PageRank |
1095-2055 | 0 | 0.34 |
References | Authors | |
7 | 4 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Patrick Maillé | 1 | 282 | 43.33 |
| Bruno Tuffin | 2 | 789 | 87.60 |
| Yiping Xing | 3 | 666 | 54.49 |
| Rajarathnam Chandramouli | 4 | 238 | 34.38 |