Title
Maps in Multiple Belief Change
Abstract
Multiple Belief Change extends the classical AGM framework for Belief Revision introduced by Alchourron, Gardenfors, and Makinson in the early ’80s. The extended framework includes epistemic input represented as a (possibly infinite) set of sentences, as opposed to a single sentence assumed in the original framework. The transition from single to multiple epistemic input worked out well for the operation of belief revision. The AGM postulates and the system-of-spheres model were adequately generalized and so was the representation result connecting the two. In the case of belief contraction however, the transition was not as smooth. The generalized postulates for contraction, which were shown to correspond precisely to the generalized partial meet model, failed to match up to the generalized epistemic entrenchment model. The mismatch was fixed with the addition of an extra postulate, called the limit postulate, that relates contraction by multiple epistemic input to a series of contractions by single epistemic input. The new postulate however creates problems on other fronts. First, the limit postulate needs to be mapped into appropriate constraints in the partial meet model. Second, via the Levi and Harper Identities, the new postulate translates into an extra postulate for multiple revision, which in turn needs to be characterized in terms of systems of spheres. Both these open problems are addressed in this article. In addition, the limit postulate is compared with a similar condition in the literature, called (K*F), and is shown to be strictly weaker than it. An interesting aspect of our results is that they reveal a profound connection between rationality in multiple belief change and the notion of an elementary set of possible worlds (closely related to the notion of an elementary class of models from classical logic).
Year
DOI
Venue
2012
10.1145/2362355.2362358
ACM Trans. Comput. Log.
Keywords
Field
DocType
limit postulate,new postulate translates,belief revision,generalized postulate,extra postulate,multiple epistemic input,agm postulate,multiple belief change,new postulate,epistemic input,knowledge representation,belief
Belief change,Discrete mathematics,Knowledge representation and reasoning,Mathematical economics,Rationality,Computer science,Pure mathematics,Classical logic,Elementary class,Sentence,Belief revision,Possible world
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
13
4
1529-3785
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
3
0.42
5
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Pavlos Peppas126531.74
Costas D. Koutras26910.06
Mary-anne Williams3953128.61