Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In order to improve outcomes of one shot noncooperative games a formal procedure for conducting preplay negotiations is proposed. For the prisoners' dilemma game it is shown that all the perfect equilibrium in the induced game (the game with the preplays) yield the cooperative pay-off. For another game it is shown that all perfect equilibrium payoffs converge to be Pareto optimal as the number of preplays increases. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
1981 | 10.1016/0165-4896(81)90015-9 | Mathematical Social Sciences |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Prisoners' dilemma,Cooperative game,Perfect equilibrium,Pareto optimum | Journal | 1 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
4 | 0165-4896 | 7 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
1.74 | 0 | 1 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ehud Kalai | 1 | 135 | 44.65 |