Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We discuss a model of an economic community consisting of $N$ interacting agents. The state of each agent at any time is characterized, in general, by a mixed strategy profile drawn from a space of $s$ pure strategies. The community evolves as agents update their strategy profiles in response to payoffs received from other agents. The evolution equation is a generalization of the replicator equation. We argue that when $N$ is sufficiently large and the payoff matrix elements satisfy suitable inequalities, the community evolves to retain the full diversity of available strategies even as individual agents specialize to pure strategies. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
1998 | 3.0.CO;2-Q" target="_self" class="small-link-text"10.1002/(SICI)1099-0526(199801/02)3:33.0.CO;2-Q | Complexity |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
replicator dynamics,satisfiability,innovation,mixed strategy,mathematics,replicator equation | Strategy,Computer science,Replicator equation,Artificial intelligence,Diversification (marketing strategy),Normal-form game,Evolution equation,Machine learning | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
3 | 3 | Complexity, Vol. 3, No. 3, 50-56 (1998) |
Citations | PageRank | References |
2 | 1.50 | 1 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vivek S. Borkar | 1 | 974 | 142.14 |
| Sanjay Jain | 2 | 1647 | 177.87 |
| Govindan Rangarajan | 3 | 111 | 11.23 |