Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Out-of-band, lights-out management has become a standard feature on many servers, but while this technology can be a boon for system administrators, it also presents a new and interesting vector for attack. This paper examines the security implications of the Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI), which is implemented on server motherboards using an embedded Baseboard Management Controller (BMC). We consider the threats posed by an incorrectly implemented IPMI and present evidence that IPMI vulnerabilities may be widespread. We analyze a major OEM's IPMI implementation and discover that it is riddled with textbook vulnerabilities, some of which would allow a remote attacker to gain root access to the BMC and potentially take control of the host system. Using data from Internet-wide scans, we find that there are at least 100,000 IPMI-enabled servers (across three large vendors) running on publicly accessible IP addresses, contrary to recommended best practice. Finally, we suggest defensive strategies for servers currently deployed and propose avenues for future work. |
Year | Venue | Keywords |
|---|---|---|
2013 | WOOT | future work,accessible ip address,lights-out server management,embedded baseboard management controller,ipmi implementation,ipmi vulnerability,defensive strategy,ipmi-enabled server,host system,security issue,system administrator,intelligent platform management interface |
Field | DocType | Citations |
Control theory,Best practice,Computer security,Original equipment manufacturer,Server,Intelligent Platform Management Interface,Baseboard,Engineering,Lights out,Vulnerability | Conference | 6 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.68 | 5 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anthony J. Bonkoski | 1 | 6 | 0.68 |
| Russ Bielawski | 2 | 6 | 0.68 |
| J. Alex Halderman | 3 | 2301 | 149.67 |