Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Substantial literature has been devoted to supply chain coordination. The majority of this literature ignores competition between supply chains. Moreover, a significant part of this literature focuses on coordination that induce the supply chain members to follow strategies that produce the equilibria chosen by a vertically integrated supply chain. This paper investigates the equilibrium behavior of two competing supply chains in the presence of demand uncertainty. We consider joint pricing and quantity decisions and competition under three possible supply chain strategies: Vertical Integration (VI), Manufacturer’s Stackelberg (MS), and Bargaining on the Wholesale price (BW(α), α is the bargaining parameter) over a single or infinitely many periods. We show that, in contrast to earlier literature, using VIVI (VI in both chains) is the unique Nash Equilibrium over one period decision, while using MSMS or BW(α)BW(α) may be Nash Equilibrium over infinitely many periods. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2009 | 10.1016/j.ejor.2008.06.032 | European Journal of Operational Research |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Competing supply chain,Uncertain demand,Bargaining,Channel coordination | Channel coordination,Economics,Microeconomics,Vertical integration,Supply chain,Stackelberg competition,Nash equilibrium,Operations management | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
197 | 2 | 0377-2217 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
26 | 1.14 | 5 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Desheng Wu | 1 | 26 | 1.14 |
| Opher Baron | 2 | 145 | 14.64 |
| O. Berman | 3 | 1604 | 231.36 |