Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
. Every n-person stochastic game with a countable state space, finite action sets for the players and bounded, upper semi-continuous
payoffs has an ε-equilibrium for every ε>0. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2002 | 10.1007/s001820200091 | Int. J. Game Theory |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Key words: stochastic game,ε-equilibrium,upper semi-continuous payoff,negative daily reward. | Combinatorial game theory,Mathematical economics,Countable set,Repeated game,Symmetric game,Sequential game,Example of a game without a value,Mathematics,Bounded function,Stochastic game | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
30 | 4 | 0020-7276 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
2 | 0.97 | 0 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Piercesare Secchi | 1 | 70 | 11.12 |
| William D. Sudderth | 2 | 62 | 16.34 |