Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In the vehicle routing cost allocation problem the aim is to find a good cost allocation method, i.e., a method that according
to specified criteria allocates the cost of an optimal route configuration among the customers. We formulate this problem
as a co-operative game in characteristic function form and give conditions for when the core of the vehicle routing game is
nonempty.
One specific solution concept to the cost allocation problem is the nucleolus, which minimizes maximum discontent among the
players in a co-operative game. The class of games we study is such that the values of the characteristic function are obtained
from the solution of a set of mathematical programming problems. We do not require an explicit description of the characteristic
function for all coalitions. Instead, by applying a constraint generation approach, we evaluate information about the function
only when it is needed for the computation of the nucleolus. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
1996 | 10.1007/BF02592333 | Math. Program. |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
basic vehicle,vehicle routing,characteristic function,vehicle routing problem,combinatorial optimization,mathematical programming,solution concept,game theory | Vehicle routing problem,Mathematical optimization,Static routing,Characteristic function (probability theory),Destination-Sequenced Distance Vector routing,Combinatorial optimization,Game theory,Solution concept,Cost allocation,Mathematics | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
72 | 1 | 1436-4646 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
35 | 4.96 | 5 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maud Göthe-Lundgren | 1 | 194 | 15.97 |
| Kurt Jørnsten | 2 | 232 | 24.52 |
| Peter Värbrand | 3 | 247 | 22.37 |