Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In this paper, spectrum access in cognitive radio networks is modeled as a
repeated auction game subject to monitoring and entry costs. For secondary
users, sensing costs are incurred as the result of primary users' activity.
Furthermore, each secondary user pays the cost of transmissions upon successful
bidding for a channel. Knowledge regarding other secondary users' activity is
limited due to the distributed nature of the network. The resulting formulation
is thus a dynamic game with incomplete information. In this paper, an efficient
bidding learning algorithm is proposed based on the outcome of past
transactions. As demonstrated through extensive simulations, the proposed
distributed scheme outperforms a myopic one-stage algorithm, and can achieve a
good balance between efficiency and fairness. |
Year | Venue | Keywords |
|---|---|---|
2009 | Clinical Orthopaedics and Related Research | spectrum,dynamic game,incomplete information,information theory,cognitive radio network |
Field | DocType | Volume |
Mathematical optimization,User pays,Computer science,Communication channel,Computer network,Common value auction,Artificial intelligence,Sequential game,Bidding,Complete information,Machine learning,Cognitive radio | Journal | abs/0910.2 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
3 | 0.43 | 9 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zhu Han | 1 | 11215 | 760.71 |
| Rong Zheng | 2 | 24 | 5.58 |
| H. V. Poor | 3 | 25411 | 1951.66 |