Title
On effectivity functions of game forms
Abstract
To each game form g an effectivity function (EFF) Eg is assigned. An EFF E is called formal (formal-minor) if E=Eg (respectively, E⩽Eg) for a game form g.(i)An EFF is formal iff it is superadditive and monotone.(ii)An EFF is formal-minor iff it is weakly superadditive. Theorem (ii) looks more sophisticated, yet, it is simpler than Theorem (i) and instrumental in its proof. In addition, (ii) has important applications in social choice, game, and even graph theories. Constructive proofs of (i) were given by Moulin, in 1983, and by Peleg, in 1998. Both constructions are elegant, yet, sets of strategies Xi of players i∈I might be doubly exponential in size of the input EFF E. In this paper, we suggest another construction such that |Xi| is only linear in the size of E.
Year
DOI
Venue
2010
10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.002
Games and Economic Behavior
Keywords
Field
DocType
C62,C70,D72
Social choice theory,Discrete mathematics,Graph,Superadditivity,Mathematical economics,Combinatorics,Exponential function,Constructive,Mathematical proof,Mathematics,Monotone polygon
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
68
2
0899-8256
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
7
0.76
7
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Endre Boros11779155.63
khaled elbassioni247335.78
Vladimir Gurvich368868.89
Kazuhisa Makino41088102.74