Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We consider a two-player, sequential location game with arbitrarily distributed consumer demand. Players alternately select locations from a feasible set so as to maximize the consumer mass in their vicinity. Our main result is a complete characterization of feasible market shares, when locations form a finite set in R^d. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2006 | 10.1016/j.orl.2005.10.002 | Oper. Res. Lett. |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
min-max payoff,location,competitive location,feasible market share,finite set,condorcet paradox,complete characterization,two-player location game,main result,feasible set,sequential location game,cen- terpoint theorem,consumer demand,select location,hotelling game,centerpoint theorem,consumer mass,euclidean space,market share | Mathematical optimization,Mathematical economics,Finite set,Voting paradox,Feasible region,Sequential game,Market share,Mathematics | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
34 | 5 | Operations Research Letters |
Citations | PageRank | References |
5 | 0.50 | 4 |
Authors | ||
4 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Shuchi Chawla | 1 | 1872 | 186.94 |
| U. Rajan | 2 | 6 | 0.86 |
| R. Ravi | 3 | 2898 | 275.40 |
| A. Sinha | 4 | 5 | 0.50 |