Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In a glove-market game, the worth of a coalition is defined as the minimum, over all commodities in the market, of the total quantity that the coalition owns of each commodity. We identify a subclass of these games for which the core and the bargaining set coincide with the set of competitive equilibrium outcomes. We present examples showing that these solution concepts differ outside that subclass. We also illustrate a peculiar behavior of the bargaining set with respect to replication of a glove-market. These examples provide a simple economic setting in which the merits of the various solution concepts may be discussed and compared. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2003 | 10.1007/s001820300145 | Int. J. Game Theory |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
core,solution concept | Welfare economics,Mathematical economics,Economics,Commodity,Bargaining power,Microeconomics,Competitive equilibrium,Repeated game,Game theory,Bondareva–Shapley theorem,Core (game theory),Bargaining problem | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
32 | 2 | 1432-1270 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
3 | 0.60 | 10 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yevgenia Apartsin | 1 | 3 | 0.60 |
| Ron Holzman | 2 | 287 | 43.78 |