Title
Deadbolt: locking down android disk encryption
Abstract
Android devices use volume encryption to protect private data storage. While this paradigm has been widely adopted for safeguarding PC storage, the always-on mobile usage model makes volume encryption a weaker proposition for data confidentiality on mobile devices. PCs are routinely shut down which effectively secures private data and encryption keys. Mobile devices, on the other hand, typically remain powered-on for long periods and rely on a lock-screen for protection. This leaves lock-screen protection, something routinely bypassed, as the only barrier securing private data and encryption keys. Users are unlikely to embrace a practice of shutting down their mobile phones, as it impairs their communication and computing abilities. We propose Deadbolt: a method for maintaining most mobile computing functionality, while offering the security benefits of a powered off device with respect to storage encryption. Deadbolt prevents access to internal storage even if the adversary can exploit a lock screen bypass vulnerability or perform a cold boot attack. Users can gracefully switch between the Deadbolt and unlocked modes in less time than a system reboot. Deadbolt offers the additional benefit of an incognito environment in which logs and actions will not be recorded.
Year
DOI
Venue
2013
10.1145/2516760.2516771
SPSM@CCS
Keywords
Field
DocType
mobile computing functionality,android disk encryption,always-on mobile usage model,data confidentiality,internal storage,mobile device,storage encryption,mobile phone,encryption key,pc storage,volume encryption,lock screen,disk encryption,cold boot attack
Mobile computing,Client-side encryption,Internet privacy,Disk encryption,Computer science,Computer security,Cold boot attack,Disk encryption hardware,Encryption,Lock screen,On-the-fly encryption
Conference
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
6
0.65
20
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Adam Skillen1101.21
David Barrera233623.52
P. C. van Oorschot34230414.39