Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We study a multi-unit auction with multiple bidders, each of whom has a private valuation and a budget. The truth-ful mechanisms of such an auction are characterized, in the sense that, under standard assumptions, we prove that it is impossible to design a non-trivial truthful auction which al-locates all units, while we provide the design of an asymptot-ically revenue-maximizing truthful mechanism which may allocate only some of the units. Our asymptotic parameter is a budget dominance parameter which measures the size of the budget of a single agent relative to the maximum rev-enue. We discuss the relevance of these results for the design of Internet ad auctions. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2005 | 10.1145/1064009.1064014 | ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
multi-unit auction,internet ad auction,truthful mechanism,multiple bidder,non-trivial truthful auction,private valuation,asymptotic parameter,single agent,maximum revenue,budget-constrained bidder,budget dominance parameter,communication complexity,combinatorial auctions | English auction,Vickrey auction,Mathematical optimization,Computer science,Auction theory,Common value auction,Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction,Reverse auction,Forward auction,Revenue equivalence | Conference |
ISBN | Citations | PageRank |
1-59593-049-3 | 96 | 15.77 |
References | Authors | |
5 | 5 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Christian Borgs | 1 | 1311 | 104.00 |
| Jennifer T. Chayes | 2 | 1283 | 103.28 |
| Nicole Immorlica | 3 | 1636 | 100.87 |
| Mohammad Mahdian | 4 | 2689 | 226.62 |
| Amin Saberi | 5 | 2824 | 224.27 |