Paper Info
Title
Dynamic matching markets and voting paths
Abstract
We consider a matching market, in which the aim is to maintain a popular matching between a set of applicants and a set of posts, where each applicant has a preference list that ranks some subset of acceptable posts. The setting is dynamic: applicants and posts can enter and leave the market, and applicants can also change their preferences arbitrarily. After any change, the current matching may no longer be popular, in which case, we are required to update it. However, our model demands that we can switch from one matching to another only if there is consensus among the applicants to agree to the switch. Hence, we need to update via a voting path, which is a sequence of matchings, each more popular than its predecessor, that ends in a popular matching. In this paper, we show that, as long as some popular matching exists, there is a 2-step voting path from any given matching to some popular matching. Furthermore, given any popular matching, we show how to find a shortest-length such voting path in linear time
Year
DOI
Venue
2006
10.1007/11785293_9
SWAT
Keywords
Field
DocType
2-step voting path,current matching,popular matching,preference list,dynamic matching market,model demand,acceptable post,linear time,matching market,voting path
Data structure,Shortest path problem,Voting,Computer science,Artificial intelligence,If and only if,Time complexity,Pattern matching
Conference
Volume
ISSN
ISBN
4059
0302-9743
3-540-35753-X
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
8
1.38
8
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
David J. Abraham119015.88
Telikepalli Kavitha253448.32