Paper Info
Title
Optimal Contracting for E-Mall Services
Abstract
We discuss an agency model for an e-market place. When a marketplace goes from brick-and-mortar to virtual, incentive issues according to asymmetric information of e-mall providers become significant because contracting for an e-mall service can be "outcome-based." We discuss the internet firm's incentives associated with the cost of operating an e-mall and different types of contracting policy.
Year
DOI
Venue
2008
10.1109/CECandEEE.2008.105
CEC/EEE
Keywords
Field
DocType
agency model,e-mall provider,e-mall services,internet firm,e-mall service,incentive issue,e-market place,different type,asymmetric information,investments,schedules,internet,data mining
Information asymmetry,Incentive,Schedule,Industrial organization,Business,The Internet
Conference
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
3
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Manoj Parameswaran136434.77
Dongsoo Shin2182.13