Paper Info
Title
A multinomial probit model of stochastic evolution
Abstract
A strategy revision process in symmetric normal form games is proposed. Following Kandori et al. (Econometrica 61 (1993) 29), members of a population periodically revise their strategy choice, and choose a myopic best response to currently observed play. Their payoffs are perturbed by normally distributed Harsanyian trembles, so that strategies are chosen according to multinomial probit probabilities. As the variance of payoffs is allowed to vanish, the graph theoretic methods of the earlier literature continue to apply. The distributional assumption enables a convenient closed form characterisation for the weights of the rooted trees. An illustration of the approach is offered, via a consideration of the role of dominated strategies in equilibrium selection.
Year
DOI
Venue
2003
10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00069-3
Journal of Economic Theory
Keywords
DocType
Volume
C72,C73
Journal
113
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
2
0022-0531
7
PageRank 
References 
Authors
1.07
0
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
David P. Myatt1122.33
Chris Wallace2175.37