Title
The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
Abstract
We investigate from the computational viewpoint multi-player games that are guaranteed to have pure Nash equilibria. We focus on congestion games, and show that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time in the symmetric network case, while the problem is PLS-complete in general. We discuss implications to non-atomic congestion games, and we explore the scope of the potential function method for proving existence of pure Nash equilibria.
Year
DOI
Venue
2004
10.1145/1007352.1007445
STOC
Keywords
Field
DocType
pure nash equilibrium,congestion game,symmetric network case,potential function method,computational viewpoint multi-player game,polynomial time,nash equilibrium,complexity,nash equilibria,local search,games
Correlated equilibrium,Coordination game,Mathematical optimization,Mathematical economics,Risk dominance,Epsilon-equilibrium,Computer science,Best response,Nash equilibrium,Folk theorem,Trembling hand perfect equilibrium
Conference
ISBN
Citations 
PageRank 
1-58113-852-0
305
16.11
References 
Authors
16
3
Search Limit
100305
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Alex Fabrikant184755.60
Christos H. Papadimitriou2166713192.54
Kunal Talwar34423259.79