Paper Info
Title
Restricted preferences and strategyproofness of singlevalued social decision functions
Abstract
The paper examines the possibility of imposing reasonable restrictions on sincere preferences of individuals to rule out strategic misrevelation of preferences. In this connection, Zeckhauser had originally conjectured that singlepeakedness of sincere individual preferences would be sufficient for strategyproofness. The main result of the paper is to show that singlecavedness, and not singlepeakedness, rules out strategic misrevelation of preferences by groups of individuals.
Year
DOI
Venue
1980
10.1016/0165-4896(80)90004-9
Mathematical Social Sciences
Keywords
DocType
Volume
Restricted preferences,Strategyproofness,Social decision functions,Majority rule,Single-cavedness
Journal
1
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
1
0165-4896
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
1
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Bhaskar Dutta121454.87