Title
On Bargaining Sets In Symmetric Games
Abstract
The paper investigates under which additional assumptions the bargaining set, the reactive bargaining set or the semireactive bargaining set coincides with the core on the class of symmetric TU-games. Furthermore, we give an example which illustrates that the property 'the bargaining set coincides with the core' is not a prosperity property.
Year
DOI
Venue
2007
10.1142/S0219198907001369
INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW
Keywords
Field
DocType
Symmetric games, bargaining, core
Prosperity,Economics,Mathematical economics,Microeconomics,Bargaining problem
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
9
2
0219-1989
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
2
0.41
2
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Marc Meertens172.51
J. A. M. Potters2679.76
J. H. Reijnierse3456.95