Title
Securing RSA against Fault Analysis by Double Addition Chain Exponentiation
Abstract
Fault Analysis is a powerful cryptanalytic technique that enables to break cryptographic implementations embedded in portable devices more efficiently than any other technique. For an RSA implemented with the Chinese Remainder Theorem method, one faulty execution suffices to factorize the public modulus and fully recover the private key. It is therefore mandatory to protect embedded implementations of RSA against fault analysis. This paper provides a new countermeasure against fault analysis for exponentiation and RSA. It consists in a self-secure exponentiation algorithm, namely an exponentiation algorithm that provides a direct way to check the result coherence. An RSA implemented with our solution hence avoids the use of an extended modulus (which slows down the computation) as in several other countermeasures. Moreover, our exponentiation algorithm involves 1.65 multiplications per bit of the exponent which is significantly less than the 2 required by other self-secure exponentiations.
Year
DOI
Venue
2009
10.1007/978-3-642-00862-7_31
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
Keywords
DocType
Volume
fault analysis,powerful cryptanalytic technique,addition chain exponentiation,cryptographic implementation,extended modulus,chinese remainder theorem method,public modulus,exponentiation algorithm,securing rsa,self-secure exponentiation,embedded implementation,self-secure exponentiation algorithm,chinese remainder theorem
Conference
2009
ISSN
Citations 
PageRank 
0302-9743
23
0.93
References 
Authors
48
1
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Matthieu Rivain1106849.42