Title
Modeling privacy for off-line RFID systems
Abstract
This paper establishes a novel model for RFID schemes where readers are not continuously connected to the back office, but only periodically. Furthermore, adversaries are not only capable of compromising tags, but also of compromising readers. This more properly models large scale deployment of RFID technology such as in public transport ticketing systems and supply-chain management systems. In this model we define notions of security (only legitimate tags can authenticate) and of privacy (no adversary is capable of tracking legitimate tags). We show that privacy is always lost at the moment that a reader is compromised and we develop notions of forward and backward privacy with respect to reader corruption. This models the property that tags cannot be traced, under mild additional assumptions, for the time slots before and after reader corruption. We exhibit two protocols that only use hashing that achieve these security and privacy notions and give proofs in the random oracle model.
Year
DOI
Venue
2010
10.1007/978-3-642-12510-2_14
CARDIS
Keywords
Field
DocType
mild additional assumption,legitimate tag,rfid technology,novel model,public transport,random oracle model,reader corruption,off-line rfid system,models large scale deployment,rfid scheme,privacy notion,supply chain management
Authentication,Computer science,Computer security,Random oracle,Mathematical proof,Authentication protocol,Hash function,Adversary,Information privacy,Management system
Conference
Volume
ISSN
ISBN
6035
0302-9743
3-642-12509-3
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
16
0.85
9
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Flavio D. Garcia143833.08
Peter Van Rossum242727.10