Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Side-channels enable attackers to break a cipher by exploiting observable information from the cipher program's execution to infer its secret key. While some defenses have been proposed to protect information leakage due to certain side channels, the effectiveness of these defenses have mostly been given only qualitative analysis by their authors. It is desirable to have a general quantitative method and metric to evaluate a system's vulnerability to side-channel attacks. In this paper, we define the features of a good side-channel leakage metric. We review a recently proposed metric called the Side-channel Vulnerability Factor (SVF) and discuss its merits and issues. We suggest the CSV metric, which tries to show how to overcome some of the shortcomings of the SVF metric, without completely changing its character. We use software cache side-channel attacks and defenses as an example to compare the metrics with known and measurable results on system leakiness. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2013 | 10.1145/2487726.2487728 | HASP@ISCA |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
system leakiness,information leakage,cipher program,software cache side-channel attack,measurable result,side channel vulnerability metrics,side-channel vulnerability factor,certain side channel,observable information,good side-channel leakage metric,general quantitative method,pca,svm | Cipher,Hardware Trojan,Information leakage,Leakage (electronics),Computer security,Computer science,Support vector machine,Communication channel,Side channel attack,Vulnerability | Conference |
Citations | PageRank | References |
14 | 0.66 | 14 |
Authors | ||
4 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tianwei Zhang | 1 | 86 | 21.44 |
| Fangfei Liu | 2 | 336 | 12.31 |
| Si Chen | 3 | 14 | 0.66 |
| Ruby Lee | 4 | 2460 | 261.28 |