Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Previous designed synchronization approaches advocate an O(1) search complexity. Although it is efficient, such an approach is vulnerable to Desynchronization Attacks, in which the secret information will become incrementally different between the tag and reader. Either adversary can utilize this to distinguish tags or the legitimate tag and reader cannot authenticate with each other. Even worse, synchronization approaches suffer from replay attacks. To address these problems, we propose a DESynchronization Tolerant RFID private authentication protocol, DEST, which forces a tag to keep its behaviors undistinguishable. DEST provides desynchronization tolerance, replay attack resistance, and forward secrecy. The analysis results show that DEST effectively enhances the privacy protection for RFID private authentication, and provides the same efficiency, O(1), as traditional synchronization approaches. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2010 | 10.1007/978-3-642-14654-1_16 | WASA |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
private authentication protocol,desynchronization attacks,replay attack resistance,analysis result,legitimate tag,desynchronization tolerant rfid,synchronization approach,traditional synchronization approach,rfid private authentication,replay attack,authentication protocol | Synchronization,Authentication,Computer security,Computer science,Computer network,Authentication protocol,Forward secrecy,Adversary,Replay attack | Conference |
Volume | ISSN | ISBN |
6221 | 0302-9743 | 3-642-14653-8 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 5 |
Authors | ||
4 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Qingsong Yao | 1 | 75 | 9.06 |
| Yong Qi | 2 | 610 | 59.72 |
| Ying Chen | 3 | 361 | 34.10 |
| Xiao Zhong | 4 | 18 | 1.69 |