Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Auctions have been proposed for allocating computation resources for Cloud computing. However, many security issues exist with electronic auctions including insider trading, private information revelation, bid filtering, and auctioneers lying about auction results for their own profit. Privacy preserving auction protocols use cryptographic methods to keep losing bid values secret but many have no means of verifying their black box behaviour. This paper presents a protocol that allows participants to verify that an auction has run correctly without revealing bid values of other participants while increasing the robustness of the auction protocol. (C) 2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2010 | 10.1016/j.procs.2010.04.298 | Procedia Computer Science |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Secure Auctions,Verification,Zero Knowledge | Bid shading,English auction,Auction sniping,Vickrey auction,Unique bid auction,Computer security,Computer science,Computer network,Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction,Auction theory,Proxy bid | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
1 | 1 | 1877-0509 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
4 | 0.40 | 13 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ben Palmer | 1 | 5 | 0.84 |
| Kris Bubendorfer | 2 | 341 | 29.28 |
| Ian Welch | 3 | 63 | 12.04 |