Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Structured overlays are an important and powerful class of overlay networks that has emerged in recent years. They are typically targeted at peer-to-peer deployments involving millions of user-managed machines on the Internet. In this paper we address routing-table poisoning attacks against structured overlays, in which adversaries attempt to inter- cept trafc and control the system by convincing other nodes to use compromised nodes as their overlay network neigh- bors. In keeping with the fully-decentralized goals of struc- tured overlay design, we propose a defense mechanism that makes minimal use of centralized infrastructure. Our ap- proach, induced churn, utilizes periodic routing-table re- sets, unpredictable identier changes, and a rate limit on routing-table updates. Induced churn leaves adversaries at the mercy of chance: they have little opportunity to strate- gize their positions in the overlay, and cannot entrench themselves in any position that they do acquire. We im- plement induced churn in Maelstrom, an extension to the broadly used Bamboo distributed hash table. Our Mael- strom experiments over a simulated network demonstrate robust routing with very modest costs in bandwidth and la- tency, at levels of adversarial activity where unprotected overlays are rendered almost completely useless. |
Year | Venue | Keywords |
|---|---|---|
2006 | NDSS | distributed hash table,rate limiting,overlay network,defense mechanism |
Field | DocType | Citations |
Internet privacy,Identifier,Computer security,Computer science,Computer network,Bandwidth (signal processing),Routing table,Overlay,Rate limiting,Overlay network,Distributed hash table,The Internet | Conference | 30 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
1.50 | 26 | 5 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tyson Condie | 1 | 1162 | 64.84 |
| Varun Kacholia | 2 | 360 | 12.20 |
| Sriram Sank | 3 | 30 | 1.50 |
| Joseph M. Hellerstein | 4 | 14093 | 1651.14 |
| Petros Maniatis | 5 | 2541 | 150.03 |