Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Intuitively, a voting rule satisfies the condition of positive association if it guarantees that an improvement for an alternative
in the preferences expressed by voters results in a change, if there is any, of the social status of that alternative in the
same direction. In this article, we consider two interpretations of this notion, and for parliamentary voting procedures,
we provide results showing under the impartial anonymous culture (IAC) hypothesis how often the positive association is (not)
satisfied. Furthermore, our analysis also permits us to investigate the relationships between these notions. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2010 | 10.1007/s00355-009-0432-2 | Social Choice and Welfare |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
satisfiability,social status,social choice | Welfare economics,Social choice theory,Mathematical economics,Economics,Voting,Cardinal voting systems,Social status | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
35 | 1 | 1432-217X |
Citations | PageRank | References |
1 | 0.36 | 3 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Boniface Mbih | 1 | 3 | 1.13 |
| Issofa Moyouwou | 2 | 8 | 3.73 |
| x y zhao | 3 | 46 | 7.78 |